Myanmar Civil War Sees New Multi-Front Alignments

Lead paragraph

The conflict landscape in Myanmar has evolved from a centralized insurgency into a decentralized, multi-front civil war that now involves the military junta (Tatmadaw), more than 20 ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and an expanding network of pro-democracy People's Defence Forces (PDFs). The 2021 coup d'état on February 1, 2021 remains the inflection point for the current phase; since then alignments and front lines have shifted repeatedly, producing new tactical coalitions and episodic ceasefires. Journalistic coverage and conflict datasets show a marked intensification in clashes across Sagaing, Chin, Shan and Kayah states in 2025, with external humanitarian metrics pointing to a substantial displacement burden (Al Jazeera, Mar 27, 2026; ACLED, 2026; UN OCHA, Dec 2025). For institutional investors, the transformation from episodic insurgency to distributed warfare has material implications for asset risk, supply-chain exposures and regional political stability, particularly for ASEAN and China border provinces.

Context

The current phase of violence has three principal actors: the Tatmadaw, a constellation of EAOs with varying goals (autonomy vs. independence), and PDFs aligned to the National Unity Government and local committees. The Feb. 1, 2021 coup is the proximate cause of the national breakdown that has since seen EAOs and PDFs coordinate operations in tactical partnerships; these are not uniform alliances but pragmatic arrangements of convenience, intelligence sharing and battlefield deconfliction (Al Jazeera, Mar 27, 2026). The geography of conflict is uneven: control is contested across five primary theatres—Sagaing, Magway, Chin, Shan and Rakhine—with shifting control over towns and rural corridors that are strategically important for logistics and resource flows. That fragmentation increases transactional uncertainty and raises the probability of localized escalations spilling across borders.

Myanmar's internal fragmentation has regional implications. Border provinces in Thailand, India and China have seen higher refugee flows and cross-border smuggling, shifting trade patterns and increased militarization of frontier zones. Energy and commodity transit routes that previously enjoyed de facto stability—particularly inland routes for jade, timber and overland gas pipe segments—face greater disruption. The political economy of war has also altered revenue streams for armed groups, with illicit economies (timber, narcotics, minerals) providing sustaining finance; this complicates efforts to isolate actors through sanctions without unintended market distortions.

Finally, the international legal and humanitarian context matters. UN and international agencies have repeatedly warned about the humanitarian consequences. According to UN OCHA, by December 31, 2025 approximately 1.2 million people were internally displaced inside Myanmar (UN OCHA, Dec 2025). Those figures deepen the strategic risks for neighboring states and multilateral institutions engaged in relief and reconstruction planning.

Data Deep Dive

Three quantified data points underpin the current assessment. First, conflict actors: reporting identifies more than 20 distinct EAOs operating with varying degrees of de facto territorial control and military capacity (Al Jazeera, Mar 27, 2026). Second, conflict intensity: the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded roughly 4,800 conflict events across Myanmar in 2025, a concentration higher than in 2021–2022 baseline years and indicative of operational diffusion into previously quieter provinces (ACLED, 2026). Third, humanitarian impact: UN OCHA estimated approximately 1.2 million internally displaced persons by Dec. 31, 2025, reflecting both conflict-driven displacement and localized food-security shocks (UN OCHA, Dec 2025).

Those datapoints should be read together: an increase in discrete conflict events correlates with territorial fluidity, and that fluidity drives displacement. Comparative context is salient: conflict events in 2025 were materially higher than in 2022 (ACLED, 2026), representing a year-on-year shift that is not explained by seasonal cycles alone. The geographic concentration of events—Sagaing and Chin showing the steepest year-on-year increases—translates into targeted investor risk where local infrastructure is critical for supply chains.

At the macro level, the conflict is lowering Myanmar's effective governance and GDP prospects. IMF and ADB estimates prior to 2024 already signaled contractionary pressure; with rising displacement and production interruptions, downward revisions for 2025–2026 are probable. That macro squeeze feeds back into conflict dynamics: fiscal strain on the junta can increase predatory behavior while international financial isolation pushes more economic activity into opaque channels controlled by nonstate actors.

Sector Implications

Energy and commodities: Myanmar is not a major global oil or gas producer by GCC standards, but its pipelines and cross-border energy interconnects are crucial regionally. Recurrent shutdowns and security incidents raise the cost of insurance for overland transit and increase the risk-premia embedded in Asian energy contracts. Investors exposed to regional LNG and pipeline projects should factor in intermittent outages and higher operational security costs. Mining and extractives are more directly affected; jade and precious mineral corridors are now contested assets, with control conferring both revenue and leverage for EAOs.

Agriculture and supply chains: Sagaing and Magway are key agricultural belts. Conflict-driven labor displacement and restrictions on market access have compressed output and widened price dispersion. For corporates sourcing raw materials or managing inventories that route through Myanmar, logistic timelines have extended and contractor risk has increased. These operational risks translate into potential margin pressure and higher working capital needs for regional producers and traders.

Financial and legal exposures: sanctions, de-risking by correspondent banks and counterparty opacity are increasing transactional costs. Euroclear-style intermediated channels and compliance overheads for financing projects in Southeast Asia now include heightened due diligence on ultimate beneficiaries. The multiplicity of actors on the ground—state, quasi-state, and non-state—creates legal ambiguity over permits and property rights that increases litigation and expropriation risk.

Risk Assessment

Operational risk: Front-line volatility produces direct operational hazards for staff, assets and contractors. Security incidents in 2025 created prolonged shutdowns for several concessions and forced evacuations of expatriate staffs. Operational contingency planning must assume episodic closures lasting weeks rather than days. That expectation materially affects cash flow modeling and insurance exposure.

Political risk: The international response is bifurcated—diplomatic pressure and targeted sanctions coexist with pragmatic bordering states preserving trade ties. This dual-track posture increases policy risk: unilateral measures by one jurisdiction may be undermined by regional actors prioritizing stability and energy access. Investors should model scenarios that incorporate both tighter sanctions and incremental normalization in different time horizons.

Financial risk: Credit risk is rising for Myanmar-facing assets. Banking de-risking has raised the cost of capital and shortened tenor for project finance. Where projects are locally financed or dependent on commodity revenues, liquidity stress could cascade. From a sovereign- and supranational-credit perspective, protracted conflict will likely keep Myanmar at the margins of global capital markets for the foreseeable future.

Outlook

Near term (6–12 months): Expect continued tactical partnerships among EAOs and PDFs that will produce episodic operational gains against the Tatmadaw but not a decisive strategic victory. Conflict diffusion will remain the dominant mode; ACLED-like event counts are likely to remain elevated relative to pre-2024 baselines. Humanitarian needs will grow, keeping displacement metrics above 2022 levels and complicating reconstruction planning.

Medium term (12–36 months): The most likely equilibrium is a protracted stalemate with localized governance vacuums. Some EAOs will consolidate de facto autonomy in resource-rich corridors, while the junta retains control of administrative capitals and international diplomatic channels. This split increases the probability of frozen conflicts—persistent insecurity coupled with low-level economic activity and hybrid governance arrangements.

Long term (>36 months): Outcomes hinge on external factors—major shifts in Chinese policy, ASEAN mediation, or a change in international sanctions architecture. A negotiated settlement that includes power-sharing and disarmament remains possible but will require credible enforcement mechanisms and reconstruction financing that are not currently in place.

Fazen Capital Perspective

Our contrarian assessment differs from a simple binary forecast of junta victory vs. insurgent triumph. The conflict's durability creates both asymmetric risks and unique informational arbitrage for institutional investors. Specifically, while headline geopolitics will deter conventional capital flows, the fragmentation of control produces micro-markets—local logistics, timber and non-sanctioned commodity trade—where price signals can precede policy normalization by 12–24 months. Tracking granular indicators (local taxation arrangements, road-access reports, and a focused ACLED sub-regional dashboard) provides earlier warnings and potential windows to hedge exposures at lower cost.

More broadly, capital allocation should reflect a structural premium for governance opacity and operational friction. That implies shorter investment horizons for direct exposure, higher liquidity buffers, and the prioritization of counterparty due diligence over headline returns. For investors with a long-term view, structured instruments that explicitly price in reconstruction and normalization – contingent funding tied to verifiable political milestones – could offer asymmetric payoff profiles, but these require bespoke structuring and patient capital.

We also recommend integrating thematic overlays into scenario models—migration flows, commodity-route disruptions, and Chinese border policy—to better quantify tail-risk probabilities. For further reading on constructing scenario frameworks and monitoring tools, see our institutional insights on conflict risk and emerging markets topic and our operational due-diligence checklist for frontier exposures topic.

FAQ

Q: How has the role of external states, particularly China and Thailand, shifted since 2021?

A: Regional states have calibrated between pragmatic engagement and reputational management. China has prioritized border stability and resource access, increasing discreet engagement with local authorities and economic actors; Thailand focuses on border security and refugee management. Both have avoided overt military intervention but have expanded diplomatic contacts and constrained the junta's isolation. Those dynamics reduce the probability of large-scale external military interventions but raise the chance of hedging strategies that complicate sanctions regimes.

Q: Historically, how does the current fragmentation compare to previous insurgencies in Myanmar?

A: The present phase is more decentralized than the post-independence insurgencies of the 1950s–60s and differs from the 1990s ceasefire era in that contemporary conflicts feature digitally-enabled PDFs and fluid tactical coalitions. Historically, extended periods of low-intensity conflict have favored de facto autonomy arrangements; the current fragmentation increases the probability that future settlement will resemble localized power-sharing rather than central consolidation.

Bottom Line

Myanmar's multi-front war has entered a durable, decentralized phase with meaningful impacts on regional stability, humanitarian conditions and investment risk profiles. Expect protracted fragmentation, higher operational costs, and micro-market distortions that require specialized monitoring and scenario-based risk management.

Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.