SPY Returns 217% Over 10 Years; Top 3 Drive Results
March 30, 20267m read1Standard
Fazen Markets Research
AI-Enhanced Analysis
SPYS&P 500ETF concentrationmarket-capSPDR
SPY, the largest ETF tracking the S&P 500, has delivered a cumulative return of 217% over the 10-year period through March 28, 2026 (Yahoo Finance, Mar 28, 2026). That headline number masks a structural change in where the returns came from: the ETF’s top three constituents now represent roughly 19% of the portfolio by market-cap weighting, with the top 10 accounting for about 32% (SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust fact sheet; S&P Dow Jones Indices, Mar 31, 2026). The combination of concentrated market-cap leadership and outsized returns from a handful of mega-cap names has produced dispersion between cap-weighted performance and broader, equal-weighted measures. Institutional investors evaluating index exposure should consider how concentration has amplified returns and idiosyncratic risk over the last decade while remaining mindful that past concentration is not a reliable forward predictor. This piece dissects the data, examines sector and portfolio implications, and offers a Fazen Capital perspective on where concentration creates strategic trade-offs.
SPY’s 217% 10-year return is a simple, headline-friendly statistic, but the composition of those returns has changed materially. In 2016 the S&P 500’s leadership was more dispersed; by March 31, 2026, the top three names — a mix of mega-cap technology and AI-era beneficiaries — accounted for approximately 19% of ETF market weight, up from roughly 11% on Dec 31, 2016 (S&P Dow Jones Indices concentration reports, 2016 and 2026). The long run of outperformance from a narrow subset of stocks has two consequences: it increases the sensitivity of the index to idiosyncratic developments at a small number of companies, and it creates performance divergence versus equally weighted or fundamental-weighted alternatives.
Concentration is not new, but its persistence and magnitude have risen. The top 10 S&P 500 names cumulatively represented about 32% of the index by March 2026, a level comparable to the peaks observed during previous periods of high market-cap concentration (S&P Dow Jones Indices, Mar 2026). For context, the top 10 weight was near 24% a decade earlier; the shift over 10 years is meaningful for both return attribution and risk budgeting. The fact that SPY is a passive cap-weighted vehicle means its exposure grows mechanically as winners rally — that feature is advantageous for rules-based tracking but creates distinct concentration dynamics that traditional portfolio constructions must acknowledge.
Those dynamics have real economic implications for institutional portfolios. A cap-weighted vehicle such as SPY performed well for investors who wanted market beta; nonetheless, the same structure has magnified both returns and drawdowns when the largest names re-rate. For long-term allocators, understanding whether concentration is structural (driven by secular cash flows and earnings power) or cyclical (driven by short-term sentiment and multiple expansion) is critical when sizing allocations relative to active or alternative exposures. The remainder of this analysis unpacks the data and examines how different stakeholders should think about concentration risk versus return capture.
Return attribution over the decade ending Mar 28, 2026 shows that a small subset of names accounted for a disproportionately large share of cumulative index gains. According to S&P Dow Jones Indices and SPDR disclosures, SPY’s three largest holdings represented about 19% of the index by market cap on Mar 31, 2026; those holdings collectively contributed an outsized portion of the 217% cumulative return cited by Yahoo Finance (Yahoo Finance article, Mar 28, 2026; SPDR fact sheet, Mar 31, 2026). When the top three names produce returns materially above the index average, cap-weighted vehicles will reflect that outcome more heavily than equal-weighted peers.
Comparing cap-weighted SPY to an equal-weighted S&P product over the same decade reveals dispersion in outcomes. Historically, equal-weighted strategies such as the S&P 500 Equal Weight Index tend to outperform during periods when smaller-cap constituents outperform the largest names, and underperform when a concentrated cohort leads. Over the last ten years through March 2026, cap-weighted SPY outperformed its equal-weighted counterpart by a margin driven largely by the top quintile of names; S&P Dow Jones Indices provides periodic performance splits that show the top decile contributing a substantial share of index returns in concentrated rallies (S&P DJI, 2016–2026 breakdowns).
A second datum: the mechanical feedback loop of cap-weighting accelerated allocation into high-performing names via index rebalancing and passive flows. SPY, as the largest S&P 500 ETF, registered persistent inflows across multiple years; contemporaneous fund fact sheets list assets under management exceeding tens of billions, placing it among the largest single-ticket avenues into the U.S. large-cap market (SPDR, Mar 2026 fact sheet). This flow dynamic magnifies the correlation between market-cap gains and index weightings, creating an environment where momentum and market structure reinforce each other.
Sector concentration mirrors the single-name concentration story: information technology and related communication services have grown as a share of the S&P 500 weight over the decade. As of end-March 2026, technology-related sectors comprised the largest share of the index by market cap, reflecting secular revenue growth, margin expansion, and the re-rating of software, semiconductor, and cloud businesses (S&P Dow Jones Indices sector weights, Mar 31, 2026). That sector tilt explains part of SPY’s outperformance relative to index constructions with different weight rules or sector caps.
For active managers and sector specialists, the concentration trend raises questions about opportunity sets. In a concentrated market, idiosyncratic alpha from high-conviction, non-mega-cap ideas can be substantial if the manager identifies mispriced secular growth opportunities outside the top cap cohort. Conversely, active managers heavily underweighting the mega-caps relative to SPY face attribution headwinds during rallies driven by those names; the relative performance profile can be binary depending on a small set of securities.
Pension funds and liability-driven investors typically care about tracking error and diversification. A higher sector concentration within SPY may necessitate tactical overlays, hedges, or complementary exposures (e.g., equal-weight ETFs, factor strategies) to manage sector-specific risk. Institutional-scale rebalancing and governance should reflect the reality that benchmark-driven allocations are not neutrality-preserving when the benchmark itself has concentrated exposures.
Concentration increases single-name and sector-specific tail risk. When the top three stocks account for nearly one-fifth of the index, idiosyncratic shocks to any one company — regulatory rulings, revenue misses, or leadership changes — can meaningfully affect the ETF’s performance. Historical episodes (for example, concentrated drawdowns in 2000–2002 and 2008–2009) show that high-concentration regimes can unwind quickly and cause outsized portfolio drawdowns for cap-weighted products.
Correlation structure matters. If the top names’ returns are driven by shared macro exposures (e.g., sensitivity to real rates, dollar strength, or AI-driven revenue cycles), diversification benefits across the index compress. Stress tests that assume independent behavior among constituents will understate potential portfolio volatility when concentration is elevated. Institutional risk teams should therefore model scenarios where the largest names decouple and decline simultaneously versus idiosyncratic declines.
Liquidity and market-impact considerations are also relevant despite SPY’s depth. While SPY itself trades with ample liquidity, the valuation and execution of large, concentrated exposures can still be challenging in stressed markets. For fiduciaries executing large reallocations away from cap-weighted exposure, phased execution and consideration of market-impact costs are prudent. Internal policy limits on single-name or top-decile exposures remain a practical mitigant for controlling concentration risk at the portfolio level.
Fazen Capital views the current concentration in SPY as a structural byproduct of prolonged, successful growth and profit cycles for a subset of companies, but not a permanent inevitability. Our framework separates two drivers: (1) genuine long-term earnings power that justifies outsized market value, and (2) mechanical and sentiment-driven multiple expansion that can reverse. Where valuation premium is driven principally by sustainable cash flow and reinvestment capacity, higher weights may be defensible for long-horizon allocations. Where premium is driven by narrative multiple expansion, the risk of reversion is higher.
A non-obvious implication is that concentration can create alpha opportunities for diversified active managers who can both identify durable secular winners outside the top tier and effectively capitalize on mean reversion in leadership when valuations diverge from fundamentals. This is not a call to abandon cap-weighted exposure — rather, it is a reminder that blending exposures (e.g., SPY plus an equal-weight sleeve, plus targeted fundamental strategies) can both capture market beta and reduce single-name tail risk. For investors focused on liability matching or low tracking error, tactical overlays and disciplined rebalancing to policy targets are practical tools.
Finally, the market’s structure suggests governance and allocation policy must be adaptable. Institutions should codify when concentration breaches trigger review, what remedial actions are permissible, and how to measure success. We also recommend periodic stress-testing against concentrated failure scenarios and transparent reporting to stakeholders on the contribution of top decile names to cumulative returns.
Q: How has the top-three weight changed over the past decade?
A: The top-three aggregate weight rose from roughly 11% at the end of 2016 to approximately 19% by Mar 31, 2026, according to S&P Dow Jones Indices concentration reports (S&P DJI, 2016 vs. 2026). That shift illustrates how persistent outperformance by a few names increases index concentration in a cap-weighted methodology.
Q: Does concentration mean SPY is a bad vehicle for institutional exposure?
A: Not necessarily. SPY remains a highly liquid, low-cost way to access broad U.S. large-cap beta. The issue is one of risk budgeting: concentration elevates idiosyncratic exposure, so institutions should decide whether to accept that exposure, hedge it, or complement SPY with alternative index constructions or active sleeves. Practical implications include rebalancing frequency, exposure limits, and scenario stress tests.
SPY’s 217% 10-year return to Mar 28, 2026 is real, but over a decade that performance has been disproportionately driven by a small cohort of mega-cap names that now constitute roughly 19% of the index weight; institutional investors should treat concentration as an explicit policy variable rather than an incidental outcome. Fazen Capital recommends governance, stress-testing, and strategic blending of exposures to manage the trade-off between capturing market beta and controlling single-name tail risk.
Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.
Sponsored
Open a demo account in 30 seconds. No deposit required.
CFDs are complex instruments and come with a high risk of losing money rapidly due to leverage. You should consider whether you understand how CFDs work and whether you can afford to take the high risk of losing your money.