Trump Says US Could Take Iran Oil
March 30, 20267m read1Standard
Fazen Markets Research
AI-Enhanced Analysis
TrumpIranKharg Islandoilgeopolitics
The United States' president publicly endorsing the option of seizing Iranian oil and infrastructure represents an escalation of rhetoric with tangible market and geopolitical consequences. On March 29, 2026 President Trump told the Financial Times he favoured "taking the oil in Iran" and said the US could seize Kharg Island "very easily" (Financial Times, Mar 29, 2026). Reuters reporting of the same interview highlighted that the number of Pakistan-flagged oil tankers Iran had permitted through the Strait of Hormuz had doubled to 20, a specific operational detail with short-term implications for shipping and insurance markets. The Wall Street Journal separately reported that US officials are weighing a direct military operation to seize enriched uranium material from Iran, while also pursuing diplomatic avenues to obtain it without a ground operation (Wall Street Journal, Mar 29–30, 2026). These overlapping reports combine public presidential rhetoric with intelligence-level planning and operational changes in commercial shipping, requiring a calibrated assessment of market exposure and strategic risk.
The remarks and reports must be read against a seven-year backdrop of sanctions, naval incidents and constrained Iranian seaborne exports. Before Western sanctions tightened in late 2018, Iranian crude exports were approximately 2.3 million barrels per day (EIA, 2018), a figure that provides a reference point for how materially a seizure of seaborne cargoes could affect global flows. Kharg Island is Iran’s principal oil export terminal, handling the majority of the country’s seaborne shipments since the 1970s; a physical operation there would not be a symbolic act but a strike at the logistics hub that underpins Iran’s hydrocarbon revenues. Since 2019 the region has seen episodic tanker seizures, re-flagging operations and convoying arrangements — developments that have raised insurance and freight premia intermittently and that underpin both the FT and Reuters reporting on permitted tankers and routing.
US public statements that elevate the prospect of kinetic action change the calculus for market participants even when such operations are not executed. Historical precedents — including the 2019 Strait of Hormuz incidents and the more recent reflagging programmes — altered time-charter and insurance rates for affected routes by measurable amounts; for example, war-risk premiums on tanker voyages through the Gulf rose materially during peak periods in 2019–2020 (Lloyd’s market reports). Even conditional talk of seizure increases uncertainty and can be transmitted through physical markets into derivative pricing and shipping insurance, compounding the policy and operational choices faced by shippers and state actors.
The reporting delivers several concrete data points: Trump’s comments (Financial Times, Mar 29, 2026), the doubling to 20 Pakistan-flagged tankers permitted through the Strait (FT/Reuters), and the Wall Street Journal account of US consideration of operations to seize enriched uranium material. The tankers figure is immediately actionable: doubling to 20 suggests a deliberate operational scale-up in Iran’s use of flags of convenience to circumvent exposure, and it alters the concentration and routing metrics shipping underwriters use to price risk. Historical export baselines aid interpretation: Iran’s seaborne exports of roughly 2.3 million bpd in 2018 (EIA) compare to Saudi Arabian crude flows that have commonly exceeded 7–8 million bpd in recent years (Saudi Aramco/EIA), underscoring that while Iran is not the largest global supplier, disruption there can still create chokepoint-specific price signals.
Operational nodes matter more than aggregate tonnage in constrained geographies. Kharg Island’s storage and loading capacity — historically among the largest in Iran — means a localized disruption could have outsized operational impact relative to raw export volumes, by bottlenecking ships and creating spot distortions. Insurance market responses to transits through and near the Strait of Hormuz typically manifest within days, with hull and war-risk premiums rising first, followed by charter adjustments and, if sustained, wider commodity price moves. Markets also react to the perceived likelihood of escalation; the WSJ’s reporting that US officials are weighing operations to seize nuclear material raises a separate but related class of escalation risk that could affect longer-tenor assets and sovereign-credit spreads.
Energy markets are the immediate channel for transmission, but implications vary across subsectors. Upstream producers outside the region could see transient benefits in terms of higher spot prices if seaborne flows are disrupted; refining and shipping sectors face more direct operational exposure through insurance and rerouting costs. Shipping firms with vessels in the Gulf, insurers providing hull and war-risk cover, and trading houses holding near-term physical crude positions are most exposed to a short-term supply shock. For reference, re-routing around the Cape of Good Hope instead of transiting the Strait can add 10–20 days to voyage times and materially increase bunker fuel and charter costs, depending on vessel speed and tides — a shift that would be reflected in freight-on-board (FOB) and market spreads.
The financial sector's exposure is heterogeneous: names with concentrated tanker or midstream assets in the region will show different sensitivity than more diversified global players. Sovereign risk premiums for Iran (and for Gulf states if escalation spreads) could recalibrate credit default swap (CDS) spreads; in 2019, short-lived spikes in tanker risk saw regional energy-related debt spreads widen several dozen basis points in some cases (market reports from 2019–2020). Commodity indexes and oil futures often price in a risk premium rapidly; however, the elasticity of hard crude supply—drawdowns of buffers, SPR releases, and OPEC+ production adjustments—will determine whether a transitory spike becomes sustained.
A forced seizure of foreign assets or territory carries high escalation risk. A military operation against Kharg Island or against physical shipments would be interpreted by Iran and its regional partners as a major act, with asymmetric responses possible in the maritime, cyber and proxy domains. The WSJ’s indication that US officials prefer a diplomatic handover of enriched uranium reflects recognition of these risks; forced extraction is a low-probability but high-impact scenario. Operationally, the cost-benefit calculus for such an action must weigh the immediate gain against potential long-term destabilisation of global shipping lanes and the legal and diplomatic fallout associated with seizing property or territory.
From a market-risk perspective, geopolitical premium increases are typically front-loaded: insurance and freight rates surge first, then spot differentials and prices, and finally longer-term investment decisions. The persistence of a premium depends on the duration of disruption, the effectiveness of diplomatic de-escalation, and buffer responses (strategic petroleum reserves, OPEC+ production adjustments). Scenario analysis suggests that a short-duration kinetic event could lift Brent spot prices by several dollars per barrel for days to weeks, while a protracted closure or sustained attacks on shipping could produce double-digit percentage moves. The materiality to portfolios depends on position sizing, counterparty exposure and hedging—areas institutional investors should monitor through real-time risk systems.
At Fazen Capital we view the publicisation of high-risk options as both a market-moving variable and a strategic signalling tool. Presidential statements about seizing oil or infrastructure often serve multiple audiences — domestic political constituencies, adversary signaling, and alliance reassurance — and do not automatically imply imminent kinetic action. Our contrarian read is that the combination of public rhetoric with parallel diplomatic tracks (the WSJ note that negotiators are pressing for a handover of material) increases the probability of a negotiated resolution rather than immediate military seizure. However, negotiated outcomes can still leave residual operational risk in shipping and insurance markets because Iran has demonstrated a capacity to change routing, flags and disclosure to mitigate sanctions impacts; the doubling to 20 Pakistan-flagged tankers is a concrete example of such adaptation.
This perspective suggests that market participants should differentiate between two layers of risk: headline-driven short-term volatility and structural operational changes that persist. The former creates trading opportunities for liquidity providers and short-dated hedgers, while the latter may require asset-level adjustments — for example, reassessing counterparty exposure in regional logistics chains or re-evaluating underwriting assumptions for hull and war-risk. Fazen Capital continues to monitor open-source shipping data, flag registries and insurance market notices alongside diplomatic and intelligence reporting to recalibrate our internal risk view for clients. For more background on geopolitical risk frameworks and energy-market linkages, see our geopolitical risk topic and energy insights.
Near term, expect heightened volatility in shipping premiums and spot spreads, with the immediate transmission channel being insurance and freight markets. If diplomatic channels succeed and no operation is authorised, markets should retrench quickly, although a higher baseline for war-risk premia may persist until signalling clarity improves. Policymakers and market participants should watch three high-frequency indicators: (1) ship-tracking and AIS data for congestion or re-routing around the Strait of Hormuz; (2) insurance market notices and war-risk premium adjustments published by major P&I clubs and underwriters; and (3) diplomatic communiqués and congressional signals that might constrain or empower executive action.
Longer-term implications hinge on whether the episode triggers a durable change in how shippers manage exposure to the Gulf. The accelerated use of flags of convenience, expanded bunker-saving slow-steaming, and rerouting will have cost and ESG implications for operators and cargo owners. Institutional investors should track these operational shifts through supplier due diligence and stress-test portfolios for scenarios where freight and insurance costs remain elevated for months rather than weeks. For analysis of persistent versus transitory supply shocks and their macro implications, consult our research on energy market resilience here.
Q: Would seizing Kharg Island immediately halt Iran's oil exports?
A: Not instantly. Kharg Island is a major export terminal, but Iran maintains export flexibility through a network of terminals, floating storage and pipeline routes. A physical seizure would disrupt flows and create immediate logistical bottlenecks, but the degree and duration of disruption would depend on the scale of the operation, international responses, and Iran’s capacity to redirect or conceal exports.
Q: How did markets historically react to previous Strait of Hormuz incidents?
A: In 2019–2020, episodic tanker attacks and seizures caused immediate spikes in regional war-risk premiums and pushed short-term freight rates higher; Brent temporarily added a risk premium of several dollars per barrel in the most acute weeks. These moves were largely transient once diplomatic pressures and insurance mitigations were introduced, but they illustrate how a concentrated chokepoint can disproportionately affect short-term pricing.
President Trump’s public endorsement of seizing Iranian oil and Kharg Island, paired with reports of operational shifts such as the doubling to 20 Pakistan-flagged tankers (FT, Mar 29, 2026) and WSJ reporting of potential operations to seize enriched uranium, raises the near-term risk premium for shipping and energy markets; diplomatic developments will determine whether this premium is transient or persistent. Institutional stakeholders should monitor AIS shipping data, insurance notices and diplomatic channels closely and recalibrate operational counters to elevated short-term risk.
Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.
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