U.S. Nuclear Build Faces Uranium Shortage

Context

The United States is pursuing a high-profile revival of civilian nuclear power as part of a broader strategy to decarbonize baseload generation, but that renaissance is colliding with material constraints in fuel supply, skills and industrial capacity. As of 2024 the U.S. commercial fleet comprised approximately 92 operating reactors producing roughly 18.8% of U.S. electricity (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2024). Globally, the International Atomic Energy Agency's PRIS database recorded roughly 440 reactors online at the end of 2025, contributing about 10% of global electricity; China and Russia remain the most active builders (IAEA PRIS, 2025).

On March 26, 2026 MarketWatch published a synthesis of recent developments under the headline that the U.S. renaissance has everything — except uranium, welders and a coherent industrial plan (MarketWatch, 26 Mar 2026). That characterization reflects three distinct bottlenecks: primary uranium supply and conversion, skilled labor (notably certified nuclear welders and pipefitters), and a fragmented policy-execution framework across federal, state and utility stakeholders. Each of these constraints has measurable leads and lags; they intersect with financing timelines for both large reactors and modular technologies, creating execution risk for projects slated to come online in the latter half of this decade.

Institutional capital is watching the space because the policy backdrop is unusually supportive. The Inflation Reduction Act and subsequent Department of Energy programs have committed several billions of dollars to preserve existing plants, underwrite new builds, and support advanced reactor demonstrations. But capital deployment timelines are conditioned on physical deliverables — uranium feedstock, qualified labor and long-lead components — that have limited elasticity in the short term. That mismatch between policy intent and industrial capacity is central to understanding near-term project risk.

Data Deep Dive

Uranium market fundamentals have shifted from complacency to tension. Primary global uranium production was concentrated among a handful of jurisdictions: Kazakhstan, Canada and Australia have supplied the lion's share historically, while the U.S. domestic share of mined production has remained marginal. The World Nuclear Association and trade sources report that Kazakhstan alone accounted for approximately 35–40% of mined uranium output in the early 2020s; Canada and Australia together accounted for another large slice. Those regional concentrations mean that supply-side shocks or geopolitical frictions can propagate quickly into front-month spot and medium-term term markets (World Nuclear Association, 2025).

Separately, enrichment and conversion services—steps that follow mining—are geographically concentrated. Russia's Rosatom historically provided a material share of enrichment services (estimates in industry literature put Russian-sourced enrichment services at roughly one-third to two-fifths of market capacity in recent years), and China has accelerated domestic capabilities to service its expanding fleet. The U.S. has limited domestic conversion and enrichment capacity relative to current and planned demand, making long-duration off-take agreements or foreign sourcing realistically necessary for many projects (IAEA; industry reports, 2025).

On the skills and fabrication side, quantitative indicators point to a tightening labor market. Certified nuclear welders, reactor vessel fabricators and specialized contractors are finite; apprenticeship pipeline metrics tracked by trade groups indicate a decline in experienced nuclear welders in the U.S. over the past two decades as plants retired and supply chains consolidated. At the same time, the number of reactors under construction globally—concentrated in China (23 reactors under construction as of January 2026) and with Russia active in export markets—has raised competition for both materials and specialized crews (World Nuclear Association, Jan 2026). The practical consequence is multi-year lead times for both human capital and bespoke components.

Sector Implications

For utilities planning new large-scale reactors, the immediate implication is calendar risk. Construction schedules that assume fast certification and local procurement are colliding with realistic lead times for reactor forgings, steam generators and fuel assemblies. Capitalized cost-per-kilowatt estimates are therefore subject to upward revision when schedule slippage, inflation and premium sourcing are factored in; several recent utility cost projections disclosed to regulators show multi-billion-dollar contingency increases when supply-chain premiums are included. That dynamic risks widening the gap between government objectives and project bankability without additional policy or industrial intervention.

For advanced reactor developers and small modular reactor (SMR) proponents, the shortage of feedstock and skilled installers is a near-term constraint but a potential medium-term opportunity. SMRs and microreactors promise factory fabrication and shorter onsite labor requirements, but they still require upstream inputs—fuel pellets, zircaloy cladding, qualified welders for module interfaces—that are subject to the same bottlenecks as large reactors. Comparatively, renewables and battery storage can scale more rapidly on shorter lead times; in the U.S. power mix, natural gas supplied roughly 40% of electricity generation in 2023 (EIA, 2023), far outpacing nuclear's share, and that dominance underlines the competitive benchmark for dispatchable low-carbon capacity.

For industrial and mining investors, uranium spot and long-term contract prices will be the primary transmission mechanism. If utilities and new-build projects accelerate long-term procurement, contract prices could move materially higher versus recent benchmarks; conversely, a slowdown in build schedules would compress demand. Historical cycles in uranium have seen sharp price rallies when contracting returns; the lead time between price discovery and production response—often several years for new mines—is a distinguishing feature that can amplify volatility.

Risk Assessment

Execution risk is the proximate, measurable risk for projects. That risk materializes as schedule slippage, cost escalation, and potential regulatory friction as vendors are obliged to source foreign services or components. Nuclear projects have a documented history of cost overruns and delays in many jurisdictions; the U.S. now faces the additional complication that supply-chain capacity is thin for components that must meet ASME and NRC standards. Any decision to expedite timelines by importing services will attract political scrutiny and potential counterparty risk (e.g., sanctions, export controls) if suppliers are based in jurisdictions at strategic odds with U.S. policy.

Market risk stems from fuel and service pricing. Uranium spot prices and secondary markets (inventories, civil stockpiles) set the near-term price environment, but most reactors operate under long-term contracts. If long-term contracting picks up in 2026–2027, utilities could lock in higher prices that feed through to levelized cost estimates for new plants. Conversely, if project pipelines defer construction beyond 2030, long-term demand could soften and slow supply-side investment, leaving a different but still significant set of transition risks for suppliers and investors.

Policy and geopolitical risk overlay both execution and market risks. The U.S. policy framework has grown more interventionist—subsidies, loan guarantees and tax credits are now central to many project models—but the heterogeneity of state permitting regimes, community opposition and interconnection queue bottlenecks creates a non-trivial probability that even subsidized projects will face material delays. Meanwhile, dependence on foreign enrichment or conversion services exposes utilities to geopolitical contingencies. The MarketWatch piece on 26 March 2026 highlighted the strategic dimension: China and Russia are not only building fleets at home but exporting technology and services overseas, strengthening their global industry positions (MarketWatch, 26 Mar 2026).

Fazen Capital Perspective

Fazen Capital views the current constellation of challenges as a structural coordination problem rather than purely a market anomaly. Shortages in primary uranium and certified welders are symptoms of decades of underinvestment in an industry that has been in secular decline in many Western markets. Our contrarian read is that the most durable value opportunities over a ten-year horizon will not necessarily be in gigawatt-scale reactor projects themselves, which remain execution-intensive, but in upstream and midstream niches where capacity expansion is both required and capital-light relative to reactor builds: conversion facilities, fuel fabrication plants in allied jurisdictions, certified welding training and modular fabrication yards. These are assets with long-term sovereign and utility counterparties and the potential for contracted cash flows if policy frameworks continue to prioritize energy security.

Operationalizing this view requires patience: mines take years to permit and develop; training programs for welders and technicians require multi-year pipelines. That creates a calendar arbitrage where private capital and strategic public investment can earn a premium by underwriting the bridge between policy announcements and physical readiness. We also observe that competitive dynamics favor regional solutions: North American conversion and fabrication capacity, if expanded, would reduce reliance on distant suppliers and shorten the timeline for bringing projects to financial close. For institutional investors, this implies a need to evaluate supply-chain exposures explicitly rather than treating new-build commitments as monolithic macro plays.

Further reading on industrial coordination and infrastructure deployment is available here. Institutional investors seeking diligence materials should also review our technical notes on fuel-cycle economics and labor training models available on the Fazen site: topic.

Outlook

Near term (12–36 months) the outlook is for continued headlines of project announcements and policy commitments paired with slower-than-expected physical progress. The combined effect of constrained uranium sourcing, competition for enrichment services and limited pools of certified welders is likely to push many projects into extended pre-construction phases or require revised procurement strategies. Market price signals for uranium and long-lead components may harden if contracting accelerates; however, the lag between price signals and supply responses argues for persistent volatility.

Medium term (3–7 years) outcomes will hinge on policy execution and industrial responses. If federal and state governments move beyond headline support to underwrite fabrication yards, workforce development and domestic conversion capacity, the U.S. can materially reduce execution risk and capture more of the industry value chain. Alternatively, if programs remain fragmented and dependent on foreign sourcing, the U.S. fleet expansion will likely be slower, and geopolitical competitors will continue to gain market share in reactor exports and supply services.

Longer term (beyond 2030) the potential for a materially larger U.S. nuclear base depends on serial success in closing the coordination gaps identified above. The historical context is instructive: nuclear-scale transitions require synchronized development across mining, conversion, fabrication, workforce and financing. Without that synchronization, capital will flow selectively to the least-conditional returns—often upstream suppliers with contracted revenue—rather than to the highest headline capacity growth projections.

Bottom Line

The U.S. nuclear revival is policy-driven and real, but material shortages in uranium supply, qualified welders and conversion capacity create measurable execution and market risks that will shape which projects succeed and which are delayed. The path from announcements to operational reactors requires purposeful industrial policy or patient capital focused on the supply chain.

Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.