Trump, Biden Align on U.S. Oil Policy

Context

The Seeking Alpha column headline on March 24, 2026 — "Trump = Biden when it comes to King Oil" — crystallizes a practical continuity in U.S. energy policy that has important implications for markets and geopolitics (Seeking Alpha, Mar 24, 2026). That continuity centers on two levers: domestic crude production and strategic releases from the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). Across the last six years both administrations have treated domestic oil as an instrument of macroeconomic stability and diplomatic leverage rather than purely a partisan policy wedge. For market participants, the headline is less an ideological pronouncement than a confirmation that policy tools previously exercised by the executive branch remain in the toolkit irrespective of who occupies the White House.

U.S. crude production has been a central variable in this continuity. The U.S. averaged roughly 12.4 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2023, up from near 11.3 mb/d in 2020 — an increase of approximately 10% over three years (U.S. EIA, 2024). That production growth has underpinned resilience in global supply: in 2023 the U.S. accounted for roughly 12–13% of global oil supply (EIA/IEA estimates). Meanwhile, strategic releases have been used episodically: the Biden administration authorized releases totalling 180 million barrels from the SPR in 2022 as part of a coordinated response to supply disruptions and high prices (U.S. Department of Energy, Mar 2022). Those are concrete policy precedents that inform the market's expectations for how any president will respond to price volatility and supply shocks.

This article examines the data supporting that practical continuity, parses market reactions and sectoral implications, and highlights risk vectors that investors and policy watchers should monitor. We use publicly available sources and contemporary reporting: the Seeking Alpha item dated Mar 24, 2026 provides the political narrative; EIA and DOE releases provide production and SPR data; and IEA/OECD commentary frames demand-side dynamics. For readers seeking further background on the intersection of markets and policy see our research on energy policy and historical SPR interventions on the energy markets page.

Data Deep Dive

Supply-side metrics point to a U.S. industry that has recovered from the COVID-era lows and is now large enough to influence global balances. U.S. crude production averaged about 11.3 mb/d in 2020, rose to approximately 12.1 mb/d in 2022, and reached roughly 12.4 mb/d in 2023 (EIA, Monthly Energy Review, 2024). Those figures imply a structural uplift in shale and conventional output driven by higher rig productivity, capital discipline among major producers, and selective reinvestment of cash flows. When benchmarked against OPEC+ output adjustments, U.S. production gains have effectively capped upside in benchmark prices during many supply-tight episodes over the past three years.

Strategic releases are a second, discrete lever. The 180 million barrel drawdown announced in March 2022 remains the largest coordinated release in recent memory and had measurable effects on prompt markets: U.S. SPR inventories fell from a peak near 640 million barrels in 2021 to below 400 million barrels after the 2022–2023 program (DOE, 2022–2023 reports). Those releases shortened the market’s perceived time to replenish and pressured prompt crude and distillate spreads, particularly in markets vulnerable to refined-product bottlenecks. The point for investors and analysts is that SPR policy is both a short-term shock absorber and a tool for geopolitical signaling — and its historical use sets a behavioral precedent.

Demand-side developments compound the story. Global oil demand recovered strongly after the pandemic, with the IEA estimating world oil demand in 2023 at roughly 101–102 mb/d, about 1–2 mb/d higher than 2022 (IEA, Oil Market Report, 2024). That growth has been concentrated in non-OECD markets and in sectors like petrochemicals and aviation. Price reaction functions now reflect the interaction of an expanded U.S. supply base and resilient global demand: when demand surprises to the upside, market participants still expect the U.S. executive branch to consider SPR releases as an emergency tool, while leaving fiscal and fiscal-policy-induced demand responses to macroeconomic channels.

Sector Implications

Refiners and integrated majors respond differently to the policy continuity described above. Refiners benefit from stable, predictable access to crude while majors capture the upside from elevated differentials and export margins. U.S. crude exports — which rose alongside domestic production — averaged over 4.0 mb/d in 2023, creating flexible outlet capacity that cushions domestic storage cycles (EIA, 2024). For refiners, the interplay between SPR releases and export flows matters for light-heavy spreads and refinery utilization rates; a large, temporary SPR release can compress inland differentials and provide a transient feedstock advantage to coastal refiners.

For upstream companies, the policy backdrop reduces tail regulatory risk associated with abrupt, partisan policy swings but increases the focus on market access and capital efficiency. The market reaction to policy-consistent outcomes has been visible in equity performance: large-cap U.S. exploration & production firms delivered total shareholder returns that outpaced many international peers in 2022–2024 as investors rewarded capital discipline and free-cash-flow generation (company reports, 2022–2024). The competitive advantage accrues to companies that can scale output without sacrificing margins — a function of geology, operating leverage, and access to inexpensive capital markets.

Geopolitically, the U.S. role as marginal supplier and crisis responder reduces the bargaining power of some oil exporters during supply shocks but increases geopolitical complexity in regions where supply is constrained. The prospect of coordinated SPR releases with allies — a tool used in 2022 — remains credible and potentially deterrent. Market structure has evolved: forward curves and volatility metrics now price in the probability of policy intervention as an embedded component of downside protection, which in turn affects hedging costs and corporate risk management choices.

Risk Assessment

Two categories of risk warrant attention. First, policy fatigue and inventory depletion: repeated or large SPR releases without commensurate replenishment would reduce the SPR’s margin of safety. After the 180 million barrel program in 2022, DOE inventories declined materially; replenishing those barrels depends on budgetary priorities and oil-price conditions that make purchases politically feasible. If inventories are low when a subsequent shock occurs, the effectiveness of the SPR as a shock absorber diminishes, raising tail risk for markets.

Second, structural production limitations. While U.S. production rose materially between 2020 and 2023, the trajectory of future increases is uncertain. Permitting cycles, takeaway capacity constraints (especially in the Gulf Coast and Permian Basin), and global capital availability for upstream projects could cap the pace of growth. A slower-than-expected production response to higher prices would increase the probability of price spikes that are not fully mitigated by SPR actions, placing additional strain on downstream and consumer-facing sectors.

A third, cross-cutting risk is geopolitical coordination failure. The utility of SPR releases increases when they are part of a coordinated international response; unilateral action can moderate short-term prices but not replace lost production from a major supplier. If geopolitical fractures impede coordination among consuming nations, markets may assign a higher premium to disruption risk, increasing volatility and complicating hedging strategies for corporates and utilities.

Outlook

Given the continuity in policy tools across administrations, market participants should operate with an expectation of pragmatic, reactive policy moves rather than sweeping, structural shifts in U.S. energy strategy. That implies an equilibrium in which the U.S. remains a swing producer with the SPR as a tactical instrument. Price dynamics will therefore be governed by demand elasticity, short-cycle shale responsiveness, and the appetite for SPR replenishment under different macroeconomic regimes.

Quantitatively, if world demand growth continues near the 1.0–1.5 mb/d range seen in recent years (IEA estimates, 2023–2024) and U.S. production growth slows to mid-single-digit percent annually, then the probability of episodic price spikes increases modestly — but so does the likelihood of policy intervention that mutes prolonged price rallies. That dynamic favors market participants who manage exposure to timing risk rather than directional price risk alone.

From a regulatory and fiscal perspective, expect incremental policy adjustments: tax incentives targeted at methane reduction, selective permitting reform focused on bottlenecks, and continued diplomatic use of energy exports as leverage. These are marginal adjustments that preserve the larger continuity highlighted by the Seeking Alpha piece (Mar 24, 2026), reinforcing the perception that U.S. oil policy is operationally stable across administrations.

Fazen Capital Perspective

Fazen Capital views the bipartisan continuity in U.S. oil policy as a structural feature that reduces binary political tail risk but increases regime complexity. Our contrarian assessment is that market participants are under-appreciating the medium-term constraints to replenishing the SPR at scale without coordinated fiscal action. If the SPR remains depleted after episodic draws, its credibility as a shock absorber will diminish, and markets will price a higher risk premium into forward curves. This is particularly relevant given that U.S. production gains are increasingly marginal and geographically concentrated (Permian-centric), raising systemic vulnerability to localized infrastructure outages.

A second non-obvious implication is for international alliances: tactical SPR coordination provides immediate relief, but it does not substitute for structural investments in global refining capacity and maritime logistics. Expect a premium to accrue to companies and jurisdictions investing in resilient logistics, storage normalization, and optionality in feedstocks. For institutional investors, that suggests focusing analysis on balance-sheet strength and operational flexibility rather than binary geopolitical narratives. See our broader research on geopolitics and market structure for deeper context.

Finally, consider time horizons: tactical interventions mute near-term volatility but can increase medium-term volatility if they deter private sector investments needed to expand capacity. From a portfolio-construction standpoint, the interplay between public buffers (SPR) and private incentives merits differentiated risk weighting across upstream, midstream, and downstream exposures.

Bottom Line

The empirical record through March 2026 supports the conclusion that U.S. presidents of differing parties have treated oil as a pragmatic policy tool: production growth plus strategic inventory management yields continuity, not revolution. Markets should price for tactical policy responses but not assume indefinite SPR capacity or unconstrained production growth.

Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.

FAQ

Q: How large was the SPR drawdown in 2022 and what effect did it have? A: The coordinated SPR release announced in March 2022 totalled 180 million barrels (U.S. Department of Energy, 2022). It materially reduced U.S. SPR inventories — from near 640 million barrels in 2021 to under 400 million barrels following the program — and exerted downward pressure on prompt crude and product spreads in the short term.

Q: Could the U.S. run out of SPR capacity to respond to future shocks? A: Technically the SPR cannot be 'run out' without political will to replenish; however, repeated large releases without replenishment reduce its margin of safety. Replenishment depends on fiscal appropriations and market conditions that make purchases politically and economically viable. If inventories remain low, the effectiveness of the SPR as a crisis tool diminishes and markets will price higher disruption risk.

Q: Is U.S. production growth likely to continue at the same pace as 2021–2023? A: Continued growth faces constraints: takeaway capacity (pipelines and export terminals), permitting timelines, and capital allocation discipline among shale operators. While geological and technological improvements can lift output, incremental growth rates are uncertain and likely to be slower absent a material change in investment incentives or infrastructure development.